From: Narasimha P.V.R. Rao
Sent: Saturday, July 29, 2006 2:41 AM
Subject: Commentary: US-India Nuclear Treaty
Namaste friends,
The US-India nuclear treaty has been passed by US congress and senate is expected to pass it soon. Many in Indian media are hailing it as two democracies coming together and generally showing in excellent light.
My astrological analysis of the charts involved is different. My reading of this whole thing is that India is being short-changed. I think India is being hasty and making a big strategical blunder, which future generations may regret. I will give my views in this mail. If you think my thinking is wrong, please ignore me! :-)
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Let me share my astrological analysis.
India's independence chart data is: 1947 August 15, midnight, Delhi.
Treaty signing data from "Jyotish Digest" is: 2006 March 2, noon, New Delhi.
(1) In the muhurta chart, Mars is in lagna. This suggests that it is a hastily agreed treaty. In the navamsa chart, Mars is in Aries, confirming the haste. He is with Ketu in navamsa, suggesting either a mistake or a hidden agenda.
(2) The AL has Ketu in it, suggesting a mistake or a hidden agenda.
(3) Navamsa is important in any treaty, as its shows various motivations etc. In the navamsa chart, lagna lord Sun is in 8th. Mars and Ketu are in badhaka sthana, showing a hasty mistake troubling later.
(4) Lagna in navamsa is aspected by Saturn, Rahu, Mars and Ketu and not by any benefics. There are a lot of negative and taamasik motivations in this deal. There is a lot of intrigue. Things are not what they appear.
(5) Retrograde Saturn transits in Cancer, close to natal lagna lord Venus. In fact, transit Saturn is extremely close to the natal Mercury. This transit is not good for calculating well and analyzing well. India made poor analysis and poor calculations.
(6) Natal rasi lagna is in the 8th deg of Ta. Transit of Mars in the 13th deg of Ta, close to natal lagna, is conducive to hastiness.
(7) Lagna in natal navamsa is in the 10th deg of Pi. Rahu is transiting close to it, in the 12th deg of Pi. In fact, debilitated Mercury, Moon and Rahu transit over natal navamsa lagna. This shows inner self coming under the influence of clouded vision, confusion, an emotional approach and poor judgment.
(8) Let us see navamsa transits. Mars transiting in the 22nd deg in Aries in navamsa and retrograde Saturn transiting in the 14th deg in Li in navamsa aspect natal lagna lord Venus in the 23rd deg of Cn in rasi, by graha drishti. The intellect (lagna lord) is under malefic navamsa transit influences (as well as malefic rasi transit influence of Saturn and Rahu).
(9) India's natal AL is in Vi. Ketu was transiting in Vi and AL lord Mercury was debilitated in 7th from it, afflicted by Rahu and Moon. This is not good for India's image. India can make a mistake and make some bad calls.
(10) In the annual TP chart of 2005-06, annual TA dasa of Mercury was running on March 2, 2006. In rasi chart, Mercury is the lagna lord in 2nd, afflicted by Sun and Saturn. In navamsa, he is the 6th lord in 10th with badhaka lord Rahu. Again, this is not showing some big breakthrough, but showing intrigue, confusion and bad calls. In D-30, Mercury is in 8th with Rahu and Ketu and shows some evil developments for the nation.
(11) If you use Narayana dasa of navamsa with India's natal chart, you will see that Leo's dasa runs from 2002 to 2007. The last one third gives the results of occupants and aspectors. If you divide further, you will see that the results of Ketu occupying Leo are given during Dec 2005-May 2006. Moon and Ketu in the 6th house in Leo in navamsa show an emotional mistake in foreign policy rather than a big positive breakthrough.
I can mention many other points, but I will stop here. But, my overall analysis of this is not positive. I am afraid India is making a monumental mistake. Its money and energy spent elsewhere may solve its energy needs much better, without tying its foreign policy, self-esteem and future policy options in knots.
I am afraid commentators from strategy think tanks - such as Brahma Chellaney - and Indian nuclear research stalwarts - such as Dr Homi Sethna - were right in blasting this particular treaty...
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If you are not an Indian and/or if you are put off by Indian patriotism, please skip this section. BTW, this section is non-astrological.
India never signed NPT because it was forced to sign it as a "non-nuclear" power. Nations such as US and China signed it as "nuclear" powers and that gives them different obligations and rights. It was not acceptable to India. India refused to sign CTBT also, as India was again required to sign it as a "non-nuclear" power. India totally rejected signing NPT and CTBT as long as it was required to come on board with the rights and obligations of a non-nuclear power, while nuclear powers enjoyed a different set of rights and obligations.
Now, under this nuclear treaty with US, India is de facto agreeing to NPT-plus and CTBT-plus kind of obligations as a *non-nuclear* power. The notion expressed by some that India is getting some nuclear legitimacy thru this treaty is quite questionable. Even the international inspections to which India agreed to open its nuclear facilities will be conducted under the obligations of a "non-nuclear" power. India is giving up its ambition for recognition as a nuclear power forever and agreeing to the most stringent conditions forced on non-nuclear powers. If all nuclear nations suddenly start developing new technology and start conducting new tests, India will have to sit and watch along with all other non-nuclear nations or risk sanctions from US which will waste huge investment it would have already made. After the huge investments required, India will be at the mercy of US and will have to always keep pleasing US or risk losing all its investment. US and India entered a similar agreement in 1963 on nuclear fuel for Tarapore reactor. After India went ahead with the first Pokhran nuclear tests, US walked out of the commitment. This time, US is ensuring that it will be too expensive for India to do something like that. In other words, US will call the shots!
In its quest for energy, India is putting all its eggs in one basket and making a huge gambit and totally ditching the ideological position it adopted for decades, for questionable gains.
And, except some strategy think tanks, nobody from media is raising a flag! It is a sorry situation.
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There is some nice analysis by Brahma Chellaney of "Centre for Policy Research, India" on this. He is a respected author on geo-strategical matters. He is not pro-BJP or something and he criticized the previous BJP government too. Links to some of his writings on this matter are given in the site below:
I reproduced some really interesting articles from this site below. Those who are interested in non-astrological material in this matter may read those.
Sarvam SreeKrishnaarpanamastu,
Narasimha
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Asian Age, 2006 March 28
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Bush traps India into CTBT
- By Brahma Chellaney
- By Brahma Chellaney
The Bush administration has attached a legally binding rider to the nuclear deal with India even before the US Congress has had an opportunity to put conditions of its own. Under the administration�s action plan, India would become a party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) through a congressional piece of legislation. This is the first time in world history that one power has sought to bind another state to an international treaty rejected by its own legislature. The US Senate threw out the CTBT in 1999.
Under subsection �d� of the "waiver authority" sought by the administration from Congress, India would be precluded forever from conducting any nuclear-explosive test. If India were to violate that blanket prohibition, all civilian nuclear cooperation with it will cease, leaving high and dry any power reactors it imports, bereft of fuel.
That is exactly what happened to the US-built Tarapur power reactors when, in response to India�s 1974 test, America walked out midway through a 30-year civil nuclear cooperation pact it signed in 1963. Although the 1963 pact had the force of an international treaty, the US halted all fuel and spare-parts supplies. Today, with the Indian foreign secretary in Washington to negotiate a new civil nuclear cooperation accord, India is reliving history.
For Washington, the nuclear deal has come handy to impose qualitative and quantitative ceilings on India�s nuclear-deterrent capability in order to ensure that it never emerges as a full-fledged nuclear-weapons state. A permanent test ban is part of its effort to qualitatively cap the Indian deterrent, while the quantitative ceiling comes from America�s success in making India agree to reduce to less than one-third the existing number of facilities producing weapons-usable fissile material.
Lucky to escape Mr Bush�s nuclear embrace, Pakistan can now seek to overtake India on nukes, as it has done on missiles. It can watch the fun as the Bush administration and the US Congress entangle India in a web of capability restraints, in return for offering New Delhi dubious benefits � the right to import uneconomical power reactors dependent on imported fuel.
The White House has ingeniously used the reference to India�s "unilateral moratorium" in the July 18, 2005, nuclear deal to make it legally obligatory for New Delhi to abjure testing perpetually. In other words, India is being compelled to forswear a right America will not give up, even as the US merrily builds nuclear bunker-busting warheads and conducts sub-critical tests.
The reference to the Indian moratorium in the July 18 accord is specifically linked to the commitment therein that India "would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US." The US imposition of both a perpetual test ban and perpetual international inspections, however, shows vividly that India is being denied the "same benefits and advantages" as the United States.
While parties to the CTBT can withdraw from the treaty invoking its "supreme national interest" clause, India will have no such option. It will take on US-imposed, CTBT-plus obligations.
Instead of repealing or amending provisions of its domestic law, the Bush administration has simply sought a waiver authority under which, if the President were to make seven specific determinations on India�s good conduct, "the President may ... exempt" nuclear cooperation with New Delhi from the requirements of Sections 123(a)(2), 128 and 129 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act.
The seven good-conduct determinations listed in subsection �b� of the Waiver Authority Bill include the following � that "India is working with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty" (FMCT); and that India is making "satisfactory progress" with the International Atomic Energy Agency to implement an "additional protocol", which will bring India�s entire civil nuclear fuel cycle and its workforce under international monitoring.
There is also an eighth determination to be made. Marked, "Subsequent Determination", subsection �d� reads: "A determination under subsection (b) shall not be effective if the President determines India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act."
India�s second-class status is being endowed with legal content, so that it stays put at that level permanently.
It began with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh�s announcement earlier this month that, contrary to his solemn pledge in Parliament "never to accept discrimination", he gave his word to Mr Bush that India will accept international inspections of a type applicable only to non-nuclear states � perpetual and immutable. Mr Bush�s waiver-authority request makes clear that he would seek to grant India any exemption only after it has brought into force a legally irreversible international inspections regime.
After being the only nuclear power to accept perpetual, enveloping inspections, India now stands out as the only nuclear-weapons state whose test "moratorium" will cease to be voluntary or revocable. Although still to build a single Beijing-reachable weapon in its nuclear arsenal, India will have no right to test even if China, Pakistan or the US resumed testing.
Having set out to drag India into the CTBT through the backdoor, the US is positioning itself to also haul New Delhi into a fissile-material production ban even before an FMCT has been negotiated, let alone brought into force. This objective could be facilitated either through a congressionally-imposed condition requiring New Delhi to halt all fissile-material production or through what undersecretary of state Robert Joseph has called "additional non-proliferation results" in "separate discussions".
The new bilateral civil nuclear cooperation accord under negotiation offers yet another avenue to Washington to enforce an FMCT-equivalent prohibition on India. In any case, once India places orders to import power reactors and locks itself into an external fuel-supply dependency, Washington will have all the leverage to cut off further Indian fissile-material production.
The Bush administration, in its written replies earlier this year to scores of questions posed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, did not seek to dissuade Congress from considering the imposition of additional conditions on India, despite a specific query on new riders. In other words, the administration may not be averse to Congress attaching any additional rider as long as it is not a deal-buster. But given the way India has relinquished the central elements of the July 18 deal, the US might believe that it can make New Delhi bend more.
What US-inspired technology controls against India could not achieve over three decades, the Prime Minister has been willing to do, in order to import power reactors that make no economic or strategic sense � retard the country�s nuclear-deterrent capability. He has offered no explanation, for example, for agreeing to shut down the Cirus plutonium-production reactor without ordering a replacement.
The irony is that a nominated PM, who has never won a single popular election in his career, has agreed to a deal with an outside power under which India�s nuclear-weapons potential is to be cut by more than two-thirds without he being required to get Parliament�s approval either for the accord or his civil-military separation plan. But the same deal needs to be vetted thoroughly by US Congress!
For a country that prides itself as the world�s biggest representative democracy, India needs to ask itself what sort of democracy it is when its Parliament passes its national budget without any deliberation, and limitations imposed on its most important security programme escape legislative scrutiny.
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Asian Age, April 8, 2006
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Five myths about the nuclear deal
- By Brahma Chellaney
- By Brahma Chellaney
The lack of transparency that surrounded the July 18, 2005 nuclear agreement-in-principle and the subsequent deal-making has come to haunt both sides domestically. But while the US Congress, in open and closed-door hearings, is compelling the administration to provide evidence of tangible gains for America, the Manmohan Singh government faces no public scrutiny of its actions that put irrevocable fetters on India�s most important national asset � the nuclear deterrent.
The texts of various arrangements have come from the US side, with the Indians left to negotiate within the defined framework. The Prime Minister admitted in the Lok Sabha on August 3, 2005 that the July 18 accord�s "final draft came to me from the US side" after he had reached Washington. This, he went on to say, "held up our negotiations for about 12 to 15 hours" because he wanted the "support" of the Atomic Energy Commission chief, who was not in his delegation. Yet, after being summoned to Washington by the first available flight, the AEC chief was presented with a political fait accompli and asked to look merely at the language of the accord.
In similar fashion last week, the Americans handed the visiting Indian foreign secretary the text of what they want as the new bilateral civil nuclear cooperation pact. All the foreign secretary could do was to say that the US text needed "further examination." It is always harder to negotiate when one side dictates the text and confines the other side to a defensive negotiating position centred on a bureaucratic haggle on words.
It is an open secret that the US dictated India�s civil-military separation plan, both by putting forward specific proposals and by orchestrating public pressure. The PM began haughtily, claiming, "It will be an autonomous Indian decision as to what is �civilian� and what is �military.� Nobody outside will tell us what is �civilian� and what is �military�." But he ended on a whimper, admitting that the US forced his hand on specific facilities. He told the Lok Sabha on March 10 that rather than place them under international inspections, he "decided to permanently shut down the Cirus reactor in 2010" and dismember Apsara � Asia�s first research reactor � in order to "shift" its fuel core.
For the US, the deal holds multiple benefits � from getting a handle on India�s nuclear-weapons programme and leverage on Indian foreign policy to opening the way to lucrative reactor and arms sales. But for US revelations, the Indian public would not have known some of the commitments made by the PM � from promising to buy "as much as $5 billion" worth of US arms once the deal is implemented (according to a July 18, 2005 Pentagon briefing) to agreeing "to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012," at least two of them from America, as disclosed by Condoleezza Rice in a recent op-ed. Each 1,000-megawatt reactor would cost India at least $1.8 billion � or 2.3 times the annual budget of the entire Indian nuclear power industry.